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Abstract
Following the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the twin goals of centralizing state
power and inscribing a uniform national identity on all citizens resulted in the proliferation of
disciplinary practices that required changes in habits and everyday life as well as in the locus
of faith, allegiance, and obedience. Nowhere were the repercussions felt as deeply as in the
Kurdish regions, where the urge to create a new citizen sparked considerable resistance. This
article suggests that alongside Kurdish nationalist movements, kinship networks and morality
constituted an alternative reservoir of resistance to the new disciplinary practices that followed
state building. By subverting state practices to make citizens legible, kinship networks, I argue,
undermined the state’s attempts to establish bureaucratic authority and create an exclusive identity.
On 4 May 2009, masked gunmen opened fire at a Kurdish engagement ceremony and
killed forty-four men and women in Zanqırt (Bilge), a village in the district of Mardin
in southeastern Turkey. According to some reports, there was a long-standing blood
feud between two branches of the family, and the assailants had wanted the bride to
marry another man. Following the incident, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdog˘an stated in
a television broadcast that “no tradition, no custom can ever justify this massacre.”
Erdog˘an’s implicit reference to “Kurdish traditions” was countered by Ahmet Tu¨rk and
other Kurdish representatives, who insisted that the incident had nothing to do with
Kurdish customs but rather was a result of state policies that empowered local clan
leaders in order to contain the Kurdish national movement.1
The murder of forty-four villagers in Zanqırt had little resemblance to a traditional
blood dispute. But the war of accusations that followed it obscures a puzzle about the
nature of authority in eastern Turkey: the resilience of local authority structures in the
Kurdish regions despite the aggressive and often violent strategies of both the Turkish
government and the Kurdish national movement to remold the loyalties of the local
population along exclusively national lines. Since the establishment of the republic in
1923, the Turkish government has pursued a repressive assimilation policy to transform
Kurds into Turks. This policy both denied the existence of a separate Kurdish identity and
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prohibited its expression. The denial of Kurdish identity and the drive for assimilation
often went hand in hand with an effort to uproot local sources of allegiance—to tribal
chiefs, religious sheikhs, and landlords—and to supplant them with exclusive allegiance
to the Turkish nation. Although it has vigorously contested the state’s Turkification
policy, the Kurdish national movement’s approach to subethnic sources of authority and
allegiance has not been all that different. Since the 1960s, urban Kurdish movements
have approached local loyalties rooted in kinship, religion, and landownership as an
obstacle to the emergence of a unified Kurdish national movement. During the 1980s
and 1990s, activists of legal Kurdish parties and the underground Partiya Kaˆrkeran
Kurdistan (PKK, Kurdistan Workers’ Party) engaged in consciousness-raising activities
to make Kurdish national identity the dominant and exclusive identity of the Kurds in
Turkey.2 The durability of local sources of authority, allegiance, and violence in parts of
eastern Turkey, then, is striking.
By “local sources of authority and allegiance,” I refer to nonnational sources of power
and belonging, rooted not only in kinship but also in religion and landownership. At
the onset of the 20th century, large landowners and tribal groups figured prominently
in the social structure of eastern Turkey.3 Although the tribal population was gradually
sedentarized, patrilineal kinship has remained an important source of allegiance and self-
definition for many families, especially in rural areas, where self-defense and the control
of land have often reinforced kin-based authority. Historically, Sufi orders organized
around particular sheikhs have also played a prominent role in regulating everyday life,
resolving intertribal and interpersonal disputes and facilitating political mobilization.4
Numerous scholars have noted the prominent role played by ag˘as (landlords or clan
leaders), sheikhs, and tribal chiefs in Kurdistan. Yet relatively little has been written on
their role in the struggle over identity and authority after the suppression of the tribally
based revolts in the 1920s and 1930s.5 Instead, the focus of recent studies has been on
two actors: the state and Kurdish nationalist activists. The dominant analytic framework
in these studies is that of political opportunity structure, which traces shifts in the
state’s response to Kurdish political mobilization in terms of the state’s repressiveness,
exclusiveness, and success in elite co-optation.6 The exclusionary and repressive nature
of Turkish nationalism, it is argued, catalyzed a Kurdish nationalist challenge, which,
in time, has overcome the fragmentation of tribal loyalties and mounted an integrated
challenge to Turkish nation–state building. Kurdish nationalism failed in the 1920s and
1930s, according to this framework, because the tribal divisions remained dominant;
it failed despite liberalization in the 1950s and 1960s because the traditional elite was
co-opted and the new, urban elite was fragmented; finally, with the erosion of the power
of the traditional elite, and in reaction to increasing state repression, the Kurdish national
movement reemerged as a more radical, unified, and mass movement in the 1980s and
1990s.7
While large-scale shifts in the political opportunity structure help to explain why the
Kurdish national movement was able to achieve greater unity after the 1980s, this model
is less helpful for understanding the unorganized and less visible forms of resistance
grounded in kinship networks, which form the focus of the present article. The existing
scholarship examines local sources of authority only to the extent that these have impeded
Kurdish national unification. Clan networks are thus conceived almost exclusively as
instruments of the state that uniformly support its security agenda in eastern Turkey.
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Without romanticizing their inegalitarian nature, my purpose in this article is to show
that the role of local sources of authority—and their relationship to both the state and the
Kurdish national movement—has been more variegated than the dominant explanations
would suggest. Alongside Kurdish nationalist movements that have openly contested
the authority of the state, kinship networks and morality, I argue, have constituted an
alternative reservoir of resistance to the state-building and nation-building projects of
republican Turkey. Such resistance was not always motivated by Kurdish nationalism
but sometimes by the instinct for survival in the face of an increasingly interventionist
and repressive state and by an ethic of reciprocity that regulated social relations.8
Moreover, it consisted not in organized, confrontational actions of the sort favored by
the Kurdish nationalist movement but rather in what James Scott has called “everyday
acts of resistance,” that is, actions that lack a clear leadership or organizational structure
but that nonetheless cumulatively undermine the authority of the state or the dominant
class.9 Although such actions are undertaken by individuals for immediate goals, they
are not individualistic; they are often rooted in communally shared ideas of justice
and rely on the tacit cooperation of the larger community.10 They are the “collective
actions of noncollective actors.”11 I argue that everyday acts of resistance embedded in
kinship loyalty—at the core of which is the principle of protecting and favoring kin—
cumulatively undermined the twin projects of nation building and state building while
creating a third layer of authority that has coexisted with the authority of the state and
of the rising Kurdish national movement.
As James Scott has argued, the 20th century witnessed the emergence of “high
modernist” states that attempted wholesale transformations of their societies according
to new disciplinary logics. From creating surnames to standardizing language, argues
Scott, “high modernist” states have sought “huge, utopian changes in people’s work
habits, living patterns, moral conduct, and worldview.”12 An essential component of this
form of statecraft, Scott suggests, is the attempt to make a society legible, “to arrange the
population in ways that simplified the classic state functions of taxation, conscription,
and prevention of rebellion.”13
Scott’s focus on state practices geared to render society “legible” suggests a theory
of state power that emphasizes the conceptual order imposed by state institutions.14
As Michel Foucault has similarly argued, modern governmentality is set apart from
other modes of rule by its rationality, a rationality that is a product of centralization
and in which knowledge plays a vital role in population management.15 This conceptual
order is established through routine administrative practices, such as census taking, birth
registration, the drawing of maps, and so forth. In Timothy Mitchell’s words, “[t]he state
should be addressed as an effect of detailed processes of spatial organisation, temporal
arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create
the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society.”16 The state’s
power, in these perspectives, lies in the ordering effects of its administrative apparatus
and the minute practices of its bureaucrats.
Such a perspective is particularly relevant for understanding the implications of state-
led nation-building projects for minority populations. The emerging literature on gov-
ernmentality and disciplinary power, however, often imputes too much coherence and
effectivity to the disciplinary power radiating from state institutions. As anthropologist
Sally Falk Moore reminds us, “the making of rules and social and symbolic order is a
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human industry matched only by the manipulation, circumvention, remaking, replacing,
and unmaking of rules and symbols in which people seem equally engaged.”17 What
I try to show in this article is that the state is not the only “center” from which order
radiates.18 The conceptual order generated by the state is imposed on social segments
that have their own moral order and “mental maps” of how the world is constructed.19
An exclusive focus on state practices to make a population “legible” and to transform
people into national citizens underestimates the degree to which other sources of order
compete with the state to shape the rules of everyday life. An analysis of order from
below can shed light on the limits of the state’s disciplinary power. My argument is that
kinship, both as a map of how the world is constructed and as a blueprint for moral
action, undermined the order of the Turkish state in significant ways.
I examine three ways that kinship networks undermined the building of a centralized
state and a homogenous nation that commanded the exclusive loyalty of its citizens.
First, as the Turkish government attempted to reorder the Kurdish regions according
to principles of centralized rule and bureaucratic authority, the networks of trust and
reciprocity between kin groups enabled Kurds to undermine state action in important
areas, such as law enforcement and border control. Second, through the agency of lower-
level clerks, kinship networks and morality made inroads into the state and transformed
the nature of bureaucratic authority, blurring the boundaries of where the state “ends”
and other forms of authority take hold. Third, local solidarities based on kinship and
reciprocity undermined the state’s project of creating an exclusive Turkish identity by
creating a fluid space in which pro-state and pro-Kurdish forces could communicate
with one another and enter shifting and flexible alliances.
In the first part of what follows, I outline the implications of Turkey’s nation-building
project for local sources of authority in the early republic. I show that not only Kurdish
national identity but also local solidarities rooted in kinship, religion, and landownership,
which had regulated much of everyday life prior to the republic, were fundamentally at
odds with the type of citizen that the republic sought to create. In the second part, I ex-
amine the ways that everyday acts of resistance rooted in kinship solidarity cumulatively
undermined nation–state building. I start with the single-party era (1925–46) and then
examine similar processes during the armed conflict of the 1980s and 1990s. These two
periods exemplify opposite poles in the Turkish state’s treatment of kin-based sources
of authority in Kurdistan: one characterized by an excessive concern with centralization
and a crackdown on local structures of authority and the other by a softer approach to
clan leaders, with a view to co-opt the local elite. By examining two periods in which
the state approached local sources of authority in quite different ways, I aim to highlight
enduring patterns of everyday resistance despite large-scale transformations in political
space. The argument is illustrated with data I collected from the Archives of the Prime
Ministry (Bas¸bakanlık Cumhuriyet Ars¸ivi) and interviews I conducted in Diyarbakır,
Urfa, Siverek, and Hakkari in 2006.
T H E W A R O N L O C A L S O U R C E S O F S O L ID A R IT Y, 1 9 2 3 – 4 6
Shortly after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, a series of Kurdish
uprisings in eastern Turkey led the leaders of the new republic to identify the Kurdish
minority as a threat to the integrity of the state. In Mesut Yeg˘en’s apt description, Kurds
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were considered “prospective Turks,” who could become full and equal members of
the Turkish nation if they could be persuaded or, more often, forced to give up other
loyalties.20
The contours of the government’s Kurdish policy were shaped in the early years of the
republic, following the Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925. Rooted at once in religion and
in Kurdish nationalism, the revolt constituted a serious challenge to the Turkification,
centralization, and secularization policies of the republic.21 A secret report drawn up
after the revolt recommended a series of measures that have since formed the backbone
of Turkey’s policy toward its Kurdish population.22 First, after noting with alarm that
the Turkish population in the region was less than one-fourth of the Kurdish population,
the report called for the assimilation of Kurds into Turkishness. It proposed that Muslim
immigrants arriving in Turkey from former Ottoman territories be settled in eastern
Turkey, while Kurds involved in the rebellions be transferred to the western provinces.
Beyond this demographic engineering,23 increased schooling, instruction in the Turkish
language, and discouragement of speaking Kurdish were suggested as the fastest routes
to assimilation. Cultural assimilation remained one of the core tenets of the government’s
Kurdish policy until at least the 1990s.
Second, the report proposed measures to increase the presence and authority of
the central government in eastern Turkey. These included building schools, hospitals,
railroads, and highways; repairing government buildings; requiring all public officials
to serve time in eastern Turkey while preventing the appointment of Kurdish officials
to serve in their own regions; and placing the region under military control. These
measures were geared to increase simultaneously the state’s coercive power in the
region and what Michael Mann has called its infrastructural power, that is, its logistical
capacity “to penetrate and centrally coordinate the activities of civil society through its
own infrastructure.”24 Along with cultural assimilation, centralizing state power through
infrastructural and despotic means became a hallmark of the Turkish government’s policy
in Kurdish areas.25 The increasingly interventionist state, and its set of disciplinary
practices, was a radical departure from the Ottoman era, when local affairs had been
largely beyond the reach of the central state.
Third, the report urged the elimination of the influence of local authorities, such as
tribal leaders, religious sheikhs, and landlords, in order to establish direct rule of the
citizens by the government. Because all of the uprisings of the 1920s and 1930s had
been initiated by the traditional elite of Kurdish society, the early republic looked at
tribal leaders, landlords, and sheikhs with great suspicion. The campaign to transform
Kurds into Turks thus went hand in hand with a crackdown on these local sources of
authority.
In the two decades following the drawing up of the report, its proposals constituted
the core elements of a highly repressive campaign of assimilation to be carried out by
the General Inspectorates, a special administrative unit with quasi-military powers set
up in 1927 to bring the Kurdish regions under control. The commitment to a thorough
transformation of society, and the willingness to mobilize violence to that end, surely
qualify the General Inspectorates for that “lethal” combination of utopian ideology
and an authoritarian state analyzed by James Scott. Since the first two prongs of this
ambitious project—the aggressive program of cultural–linguistic assimilation and the
increased presence of the state and its coercive institutions in Kurdish regions—have
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been studied extensively, I focus here on the third, the attempt to destroy “traditional”
society in order to make a new type of citizen.26
The government’s analysis in the 1920s and 1930s that Kurds were Turks who could
be “reminded” of their true identity if only they could be stripped of their loyalty to
exploitative local patrons is clear in the statements of the Eastern Independence Tribunal
that tried Sheikh Said and his followers. In a spirit of revolution, the court stated:
The poor people of this region who, for years, have been exploited, worn out, and suffered under the
pressures of sheikhs, landlords, and beys [notables], people whose property, lives, and honor have
been sacrificed for the whims of sheikhs, beys, and landlords will from now on free themselves
from your depravity and cruelty, and they will follow the paths of our republic which promise
prosperous progress and happiness.27
Such a perspective is also evident in the 1937 report of an inspector general who blamed
the insurgencies on “a coterie of discontented leaders” who had “developed an interest
in the continuation of insurgency in order to perpetuate their previous authority.”28 The
inspector’s diagnosis reflected the worldview of the republican elite, who considered pre-
republican structures of authority and legitimacy as corrupt, exploitative, and backward.
To eliminate the layers of authority between individuals and the state, the Settlement
Law of 1934 formally abolished the tribe.29 It also attempted to physically separate
the traditional elite from ordinary Kurdish men and women. Without mentioning the
word “Kurd,” the law authorized the government to resettle “tribes [and nomads] who
are citizens of Turkey but are not loyal to the Turkish culture,” “those who are loyal
to the Turkish culture but do not speak Turkish,” and “those who have previously
served as tribal chiefs, beys, ag˘as, or sheikhs, or who aspire to do so.”30 Based on the
settlement laws, tens of thousands of Kurds were moved to western parts of Turkey
while a significant “Turkish” presence was created in historically Kurdish areas by the
settlement of non-Kurdish Muslim immigrants. While some of the spatial-reorganization
policies reflected a concern with ethno-national difference—hence, the categorizations
based on “language” and “culture”—others were designed specifically to transform the
authority structure of Kurdish society and weaken the loyalties of Kurds to their landlords
and their religious and tribal leaders. In one report, the inspector general recommended
“the removal, from villages, of those who have been sheikhs or aspire to serve as sheikhs,
and their being placed under the custody and permanent supervision of the police” and
demanded that the inspectors general be authorized to resettle the families of these
sheikhs.31 After the Sheikh Said and Ag˘rı revolts, the inspectors general, who exercised
wide and often arbitrary power in eastern Turkey, were authorized to relocate influential
families into western Turkey; around 25,000 Kurds were resettled in the 1930s.32 If
the government could remove the ruling strata of Kurdish society from the region,
the inspectors assumed, the local population would naturally shift its loyalties to the
republican state and “return” to its original, that is, Turkish, identity.
The assumption that Kurdish rebellions resulted from the tribal-feudal structure of
the region also drew the government into arenas that were previously only loosely
regulated. Practices associated with tribalism and “feudalism” and over which the central
government had very little control—land ownership patterns, blood feuds, and cross-
border smuggling—were now viewed with suspicion and became subject to a deeper
level of regulation. In order to break the link between the ruling strata and the peasants,
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the government sporadically tried, without success, to confiscate the lands of the leading
families and redistribute them to peasants. Another area of concern was blood feuds.
A 1937 law authorized the government to forcibly remove the relatives of individuals
involved in a blood dispute and to relocate them in areas at least 500 kilometers from
their original dwelling places.33 As in the arrangements with settlement, relocation
was utilized as a means to discipline actions rooted in local loyalties and obligations.
Although the punishment for intentional manslaughter ranged between twenty-four
and thirty years, a 1953 amendment to the Criminal Code of 1926 stipulated that
manslaughter with the intent to seek blood revenge would be punished by the death
penalty.
Cross-border smuggling—facilitated by the tribal networks that connected Kurds in
Turkey, Syria, and Iraq—was identified as a major threat to the regime. The ease with
which Kurds crossed the border undermined the government’s efforts to institutionalize
borders as containers of discrete nations.34 To be sure, smuggling was considered a
serious crime everywhere. In the Kurdish border regions, however, state officials drew
broader connections between smuggling and threats to regime stability. In one report to
the prime minister, the inspector general wrote, “Smuggling constitutes a subject that
must be treated with utmost concern from the point of view of security. The issue of
smuggling is the sole vehicle for political propaganda, arms smuggling, and leadership
for organizations and individuals with malicious aims.”35 Here, the phrases “political
propaganda” and “individuals with malicious aims” can be read as code words for “Kur-
dish bandits and rebels,” who consumed much of the energy of law enforcement forces.
The officials linked smuggling with Kurdish nationalist activities in part because Kurdish
society remained highly illegible to the officials, who could not always distinguish a
rebel from a bandit. Smuggling was discussed in the parliament in 1937 together with
the Dersim uprising and the “intransigence” of tribal leaders, revealing the connections
government officials drew between tribes, Kurdish nationalism, and smuggling.36
In sum, during the first two decades of state building, the government not only
initiated several military campaigns against Kurdish insurgents and a massive propa-
ganda campaign to cultivate Turkish identity in the hearts and minds of the citizenry
but also was embroiled in a war of another sort, to destroy local sources of authority
and allegiance so that power could be concentrated in one center, the state. To this end,
populations were moved, families broken up, religious leaders placed under surveillance,
land confiscated, and tribes resettled. Like the insistence that everyone identify himself
or herself as Turkish, it emerged from a certain way of seeing the citizen in relation to
the state, in which citizens, stripped of their parochial ties, would speak one language,
obey one law, and profess one loyalty. In the next section, I examine the complications
that this vision encountered at the local level.
K IN S H IP N E T W O R K S A N D E V E RY D AY R E S IS TA N C E
Engaging the Bureaucracy
As the General Inspectorates embarked on their task of transforming the fabric of
everyday life in the Kurdish regions, they confronted a great deal of resistance, both
overt and covert. Overt resistance included the numerous politically motivated regional
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uprisings, among them the Sheikh Said Rebellion of 1925, the Ag˘rı uprising of 1930, and
the Dersim uprising of 1937 and 1938. But the General Inspectorates also faced resistance
of a subtler kind in everyday acts embedded in kinship solidarity. These invisible ties of
commitment and solidarity appeared to the officials as an “unorganized and unspoken
conspiracy,” to borrow a phrase from Nathan Brown, and formed a “protective covering
for those willing to break the law,” disrupting the form of governmentality that the
officials were trying to cultivate.37 In a 1931 report, the inspector general wrote that his
efforts on crime prevention had failed, because
with the assistance of their tribes and families, [the rebels] find shelter in the mountains, and again
with the help of their families acquire such needs as food supplies, arms and ammunition, and
as a result, continue in rebellious activities. . . . Since the behavior of the families and relatives
do not constitute crime per se, these [the families] do not receive punishment, yet another reason
emboldening [the rebels].38
The cause of the inspector’s frustration was that the rebels were embedded in networks
that challenged the state’s capacity for surveillance and punishment.
Not only did kinship ties facilitate cooperation between Kurds escaping the clutches of
government but also a morality of reciprocity based on kinship and familiarity began to
make its way into the lower echelons of the bureaucracy. In order to centralize authority
in state institutions, the government had to keep a tight rein on its own officials. Securing
the obedience of public officials to orders from the top proved difficult, however, when
these officials began to form links with members of the local society. To begin with,
while the higher-level officials—such as judges, prosecutors, governors, and members
of the gendarmerie—arrived in the region from different provinces on a rotation basis,
lower-level officials were recruited from the local population. This local tie greatly
bothered another inspector general, who noted in a 1937 report:
Another issue of concern is the lower-level public officials, muhtars [village headmen], and
watchmen. This class is from the local population. These frequently have some sort of connection
with one or the other beys or tribal chiefs. This makes it hard to keep the confidentiality of the
measures taken by the government and facilitates the work of rebellious groups.39
The inspectors were faced with a structural dilemma. Their project to transform Kurdish
society required that the public officials tasked with implementation be outsiders. This
principle was stressed several times in the report drawn up after the Sheikh Said Rebellion
and repeated in subsequent reports.40 At the same time, the exclusion of local society
from governance made it difficult for the officials to have access to local knowledge. The
intermediate category of lower-level clerks, who were drawn from the local society but
part of the state bureaucracy, occupied an ambiguous position. Through their contacts
in this lower echelon, Kurds were able to neutralize a great number of governmental
practices.
Beyond “facilitating the work of rebellious groups,” influence over lower-level of-
ficials enabled the local society to resist the encroachments of the state, most notably,
through the manipulation of state records. By strategically changing their age records,
for instance, many Kurdish families escaped the clutches of the criminal law or served
substantially reduced sentences. As late as the 1980s, criminal sentences in cases of
murder of women by their families were lowered due to the age of the accused in nearly
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a quarter of the cases in Urfa, while nearly a third of murder cases committed with
the intention of “cleansing family honor” or seeking blood revenge resulted in acquittal
due to the inability of law enforcement officials to penetrate through family solidarities
and find sufficient evidence. By not registering female births or marriages, furthermore,
many Kurdish families avoided the provisions of the civil code on marriage age, divorce
rights, and inheritance.41 Hence, not only the model citizen but also the model family
propagated by the republic failed to take hold in Kurdish regions.
Similarly, attempts to rationalize and reform land ownership in favor of smallholders
often failed, in part because local notables were able to manipulate the records. In
response to a report on the problem of landlessness in the province of Ag˘rı, the minister
of health and social services wrote, “In all of the Eastern provinces, 80 percent of the
lands under cultivation do not correspond to actual land deeds, and it is not known
by which means these persons have acquired the lands under their occupancy.”42 An
inspector from the Republican People’s Party touring Tunceli (Dersim) in the 1940s
complained to the ministries of finance and agriculture that
The lands of the individuals sent to the West are being sold [to the population] through an
auction. Those who have money take advantage of this and the local population remains maraba
[landless]. . . . As we are moving to tie the peasants to the land, we need to abandon this auction
method, which provides land to the rich and once again leaves the maraba destitute.43
Here, “the individuals sent to the West” referred to influential families that had par-
ticipated in the Dersim revolt. The government had hoped to end their local influence
by selling their confiscated land to peasants. But it could not control who bought the
auctioned land. It appears from the reports that peasants often cooperated with their
former landlords (who may often have been their relatives) rather than use the state
as a leverage to transform class relations locally, as the planners of the program had
hoped. In sum, the landlords, through their control of peasants and their contacts in
land registration offices, often succeeded in reacquiring the property confiscated from
them. The resilience of landowners despite pressures from the state seems to have had a
lasting effect. According to a study conducted in 1980, 11.6 percent of total households
owned 59.9 percent of land, while small landowners, who constituted 56 percent of the
households, owned 8.7 percent of the land.44 In large part, such resilience depended on
the ag˘as’ mediating role between the state and the peasants and their ability to provide
resources and protection to their constituencies. Through their contacts in the bureau-
cracy, ag˘as helped peasants avoid conscription, taxation, and arrest, and they served as
mediators in local disputes. Hence, the ag˘a–peasant relation was rarely experienced as
pure class domination, although it certainly was a relationship based on inequality.
Beyond facilitating quotidian conspiracies against government designs, kinship moral-
ity at times absorbed the centrally appointed officials serving temporary duties in eastern
Turkey into the local network of relationships. In a 1930 report, the first inspector gen-
eral complained that some gendarmerie officials who stayed too long in the region and
married locally began to prioritize their newly acquired family and clan concerns over
their official duties.45 In these borderlands, public officials’ loyalties were ambiguous
and could shift in favor of the locals through intimate relations, unless their superiors
devised techniques to prevent such “border” crossing. In order to preempt the corruption
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of his officials, the inspector recommended that no gendarmerie official stay in the region
for longer than three years.
A circular issued in 1939 “to abolish the problem of kirvelik which frequently be-
comes a pretext to provoke incidents in the East region” provides a colorful example
of how locals employed kinship morality to redefine their relationship with the state.
The governor of Kars complained that citizens approached public officials with offers
to make them kirves or godfathers to their sons. Since becoming a kirve would create a
lifelong obligation to protect the interests of the boy entrusted to him, the governor was
concerned that his officials’ loyalties would shift from their superiors in the bureaucracy
to the local families. In alarm, the governor wrote:
We cannot recognize a kinship relation contrary to the form, character, and degrees of kinship
registered in the civil code, which is one of the main legislations of our secular Republic and a
unique aspect of the regime. . . . I hereby declare as void the title of kirve that has been acquired
by any of the uniformed or non-uniformed employees and public officials within the province of
Kars.46
It appears from the governor’s circular that some local families were trying to translate
the command relationship between public officials and themselves into a locally intel-
ligible relationship in which they could hold the officials accountable. The matter was
apparently serious enough for the governor to send copies of the circular to the prime
minister, the chief of the general staff, the Interior Ministry, and the ministries of justice
and national defense.
With the transition to a multiparty regime in 1946, it became more difficult for the
government to use force in its campaign of assimilation. Prior to that time, the Republican
People’s Party did not have branch offices in most eastern provinces. Relations were
handled through the General Inspectorates and the People’s Houses, which also opened
much later in eastern Turkey. As the first competitive elections loomed on the horizon,
Republican People’s Party officials understood that they would have to rethink their top-
down transformation project. One party official wrote to the party secretariat in 1945, “I
am personally of the opinion that the time has come to establish normal administration
and to end the exiles, imprisonments and pressures in these provinces.”47 In considering
a softer approach to increase its popularity, the party also had to revise its position on
local notables. A party member inspecting Urfa in 1950 wrote to the general secretariat
that some of the party’s administrative principles would have to be reworked in the
eastern provinces:
Previously, it was thought unnecessary, even harmful, to spread the organization [all the way to
the villages and the tribes]. However . . . the compulsion to prevail over the Democrat Party has
made this an exigency. . . . [I]n order to build a strong party organization in this province, it is
necessary to have tribal leaders and people who own villages on our side and to preserve their
status and honor. . . . With the condition that we will never tolerate the unjust abuse of the peasant
by his ag˘a, we felt that it is necessary to adapt to the requirements of the locality.
For this reason, it has become necessary to open many nominal branches. . . . One tribal leader
does not want to submit to another. Therefore, it is not possible to bring together several tribal
leaders under a single district. It is necessary, instead, to treat each tribe nominally as a district
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of its own and to treat the villages loyal to that tribe as subdistricts of that district, and that is the
way we have gone.48
The party member then asked the central organization for permission to open “nominal
branches” corresponding to tribal areas beside the “real branches” in Urfa’s official
districts. In this case, the hierarchical organizational model of the party, branching off
from the capital to the provinces, and from the provinces to the districts, had to be
adjusted to accommodate the segmentary logic of the tribe, in which those in closest
proximity to one another had the deepest rivalries and were thus least likely to unite in
a corporate unit. The foot soldiers of the “high modernist” state sometimes had to “see
like a tribe” in order to bring the state to these remote outposts.49
Kinship networks thus enabled a variety of resistant acts that cumulatively under-
mined the state-building project. First, they served as networks of information and trust
accessible only to the locals, regularly disrupting law enforcement. Second, contacts
in the lower-level bureaucracy enabled local society to manipulate crucial records on
population, land ownership, and marriage, creating a problem of legibility and posing
important challenges for the institutionalization of state law. Third, state officials who
were sent from outside the region were occasionally absorbed in the local moral order
and began to act according to local rules, favoring “kin” and ignoring the commands
from above. On the ground, then, quotidian conspiracies rendered the boundary between
state and society fuzzy, undermined the state’s infrastructural power, and impeded state
rationality and order from deepening its hold over the imagination of citizens.
Kinship Bonds in the War over Loyalty
The rise of an armed Kurdish movement for independence during the 1980s changed the
state’s approach to Kurdish society and local sources of authority in important respects.
Efforts at assimilation and centralization, which formed core principles during the 1930s,
continued. But the harsh treatment of the traditional elite, already softened somewhat
after the transition to a multiparty regime in 1946, was abandoned in favor of a military
strategy to organize clan groups into local militias that would fight guerillas of the PKK
through the so-called village guard system.
The dominant perspective in Kurdish studies holds the village guard system exclu-
sively responsible for strengthening the sway of clans in Kurdish society. This framework
is in line with the postcolonial literature that often imputes the resilience of “traditional”
authority in colonized societies to the designs of the colonial state.50 My purpose here is
not to deny the significance of the village guard system for rejuvenating clan networks,
nor to overlook the colonial origins of such a system of governance, but rather to propose
a more nuanced perspective that recognizes the limits of the state’s control of clans and
considers the possibilities for resistance that kinship networks opened.
The PKK originated in 1978 under the leadership of Abdullah ¨Ocalan to liberate
Kurdistan from Turkish colonialism. From the start, the PKK not only targeted what
it saw as external enemies—Turkish colonialism and its foreign supporters—but also
aimed at reorganizing the power structure of Kurdish society. In its manifesto, the PKK
identified Turkish colonialism, foreign imperialists, and the native “feudal-compradors”
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as the foremost targets of the Kurdish revolution.51 On the last of these groups, ¨Ocalan
wrote:
This class, which has only augmented, under the Turkish Republic, the servant role it played since
the Middle Ages, which has daily passed on the surplus value it appropriated [from the peasants]
to Turkey, which is not in the least concerned with the independence or industrialization of the
homeland, and which has long planned its exit strategy to Turkey, has no place in Kurdistan.52
Despite its hostility to Turkish nationalism, the Manifesto’s discourse on the feudal-
compradors resembled the discourse of the General Inspectorates during the 1930s. The
redemption of Kurdistan required the elimination of local layers of identity and loyalty
and their replacement with allegiance to an exclusive Kurdish identity.
When it started small-scale attacks in 1978, the PKK (then known as Apocular,
supporters of Apo) deliberately targeted a number of influential clan leaders, especially
those affiliated with right-wing political parties, to underline the class dimension of its
struggle. In the Hilvan district of Urfa, which was dominated by two rival clans, Apocular
received protection from the Paydas¸ clan and attacked their rivals, the Su¨leymanlar clan.
Next, Apocular turned their attention to nearby Siverek, controlled by the Bucak clan. In
July 1979, PKK militants unsuccessfully tried to assassinate Mehmet Celal Bucak, leader
of the Bucak clan, a member of parliament from the Justice Party, and a landowner with
tens of thousands of dunams under his control.53 A chaotic period of violence ensued, in
which the militants settled in Siverek and skirmishes occurred daily between the PKK
and the Bucaks. Within three months in 1980, twenty-one people died and scores of
others were wounded, while the police did not leave its headquarters.54
In response to the increasing regional influence of the PKK, which started more large-
scale operations in 1984, the government initiated the village guard system in 1985. An
amendment to the Village Law of 1924 authorized provincial governors to appoint
“temporary” (paid) and “voluntary” (unpaid) village guards in provinces determined
by the Council of Ministers.55 Village guards were recruited locally from among the
rural Kurdish population with an official mandate to “defend” their villages from the
PKK and to “assist” security forces in their duties. The government would provide their
salaries, weapons, clothing, and the compensation they would receive at the end of their
service. Although the bylaws stipulated that a village guard could not have a criminal
record or an ongoing blood dispute with another family, in practice the offer to join
the militia often came with an implicit understanding that previous crimes would not
be prosecuted. Moreover, while village guards were to be supervised by the governor
according to the law, in practice their appointment and training was controlled largely by
the gendarmerie, a de facto arrangement that protected the guards from accountability
to both citizens and the administration.56
Recruitment into the village guards occurred not through individual applications but
rather by informal deals between security officials and influential clan leaders. Clan
leaders served as intermediaries who could guarantee the loyalty of large numbers of
men. For the selection of these intermediaries, the state had at its disposal a list of Kur-
dish tribes, their alignment during previous insurgencies, and their current allegiances,
compiled in the early 1970s.57 One recruit was Tahir Adıyaman, the chief of the Jirki
tribe, who reportedly commanded 5,000 men in the S¸ırnak-Hakkari area. Previously, the
Jirki tribe had supported the Barzani movement of Iraq. Tahir Adıyaman himself had
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participated in a raid in which seven Turkish soldiers and a prosecutor had been killed in
1975. Adıyaman joined the village guards in exchange for nonaction on these previous
crimes. Another recruit was Sedat Bucak, the influential leader of the Bucak family in
Siverek, which had suffered severe casualties from the PKK from 1978 to 1980. Bucak
joined the village guards in the early 1990s, when the PKK began to pressure him to join
the party.58 According to official sources, Sedat Bucak had around 430 guards under
his control.59 In Van, Sadun Seylan of the Alan tribe, who allegedly owned twenty-six
villages and controlled 500 guards, was recruited as a village guard head.60 According
to statements made by interior ministers in response to parliamentary motions in 2003
and 2005, there were nearly 60,000 village guards on the government payroll in addition
to 25,000 voluntary village guards. In 2005, the monthly salary of a temporary village
guard was 390 New Turkish Liras, approximately U.S. $290, compared to a monthly
GDP per capita of less than $100 for most provinces in the region, as reported in
2001.61
Although the state benefited from this alliance, it could not always protect the village
guards. In its early years, the PKK vigorously attacked village guards and their families,
along with Turkish targets. For instance, in February 1987, PKK militants attacked the
homes of village guards in Tas¸delen village in Hakkari and killed fourteen villagers.62 In
nearby Is¸ıkveren village, the 25,000-strong Batuyan tribe, which owned twelve villages
and fifty-two fields, lost twenty-two members in PKK attacks.63 In June 1987, thirty
villagers were killed in Pınarcık, a small village near Mardin that supplied eight village
guards to the government’s militia. PKK militants also hanged village guards on trees
and stuffed their mouths with money to deter other villagers from joining the militia
force.64 According to the PKK, between 1984 and 1988, 600 village guards left their
posts as a result of these operations, by surrendering to the PKK, returning their weapons
to the state, or leaving the region.65 The party justified these attacks in terms of both
nationalism and class struggle, since village guards had not only betrayed the Kurdish
nation but also often belonged to the networks of the “feudal-comprador class.”
The state could not, however, control what the village guards did with the resources
they garnered from the state or for that matter their deeper loyalties. Already in 1994, a
parliamentary investigation commission protested that the village guard system was out
of control:
Today, a large portion of arms and drug smuggling is still under the control of village guards.
Influential persons in the region have used the village guard system as a basis for their dominion.
Tribal leaders who are now village guard heads have become much more ruthless and lawless in
their behavior, exerting pressure on people who don’t support them. They have passed on false
information on these individuals to security forces, claiming they are PKK supporters. Several
village guards have killed villagers with whom they have blood feuds based on the pretext that
the latter are PKK members and pressured these villagers to desert their villages.66
The village guard system resulted in the proliferation of an illegal sphere beyond the
control of the state. The security establishment’s tolerance of this illegality as a necessary
price for employing a divide and rule strategy created a sphere in which shifting and
multiple alliances could be struck without being legible to the state. An army general
stationed in Hakkari between 1993 and 1995 wrote in his memoirs that “either because
of fear or faith, some [village guards] were covertly supporting the PKK with their
108 Ceren Belge
state-issued guns and salary. That was not enough; they were participating in the oper-
ations of the PKK against the state.”67 According to the interior minister, the posts of
3,498 village guards were terminated from 1985 until 1997 for involvement in various
crimes including aiding the PKK (1,992), homicide (217), fraud (142), abduction of
women and girls (17), rape (13), drug trade (65), arms smuggling (58), animal theft
(25), breaking into a house (40), and participating in intravillage and intratribal conflicts
(17).68 It appears that many village guards used their affiliation with the state to pursue
local goals and that many others had become double agents, receiving salaries from the
state while aiding the operations of the PKK. Enlistment in the village guards could
serve as a cover for enterprising strongmen, who moved in and out of contradictory
alliances while amassing local power.
In time, the PKK, too, reversed its strategy toward clan leaders and village guards.
As early as 1984, the Central Committee noted the need to develop more cautious
relations with clan leaders.69 In my interviews in 2006, a number of Kurdish activists
confirmed the view that the PKK’s initial attacks against clan leaders had been a “strategic
mistake.”70 As McDowall writes, “Rather than assaulting the agha class as a whole, the
PKK operated with fine calculation, exploiting blood feuds where these existed, helping
to create them where they did not.”71 The PKK sometimes played a mediating role
comparable to those played by landlords. In a story recounted during my research, when
Nuriye, a woman in her teens from Kızıltepe, ran away from home to marry a man her
family objected to, her parents went to the PKK, which found and returned Nuriye to her
parents.72 On an ideological level, the PKK maintained a Marxist-feminist discourse on
women that blamed the “feudal” structure for women’s status. At the level of practice,
however, it was often difficult to separate the patriarchal ideology of honor, which the
PKK condemned, from the mobilization potential sustained by kinship networks, which
the PKK needed.
The PKK’s softening approach toward clans was also reflected in a change of strategy
toward village guards. In December 1987, at the close of a particularly violent year,
the PKK reached several resolutions at its First State Conference in Botan and Serhed.
First, it was decided that the organization would be more careful in its punishment of
village guards and take certain background factors into consideration before executing
them. Second, the organization decided that “instead of a dangerous course of action”
that would pit an entire tribe against the PKK, “the right course of action is to target
[only] the organizers.”73
Both the government and the PKK thus sought the support of influential clans. Often,
a village would be raided by the gendarmerie on one night and by PKK militants on
another. Villagers had to be very careful, therefore, in expressing loyalty to one or
the other of these forces. Not infrequently, clan leaders cooperated with both. One
interviewee noted, for instance, that during one period the PKK reached an implicit
agreement with the Jirki clan (who had become village guards) that their militias would
not attack each other. It was precisely their capacity to move in and out of dual alliances
with the state and the Kurdish nationalist movement—and not only their instrumental
use by the state—that enabled clans to thrive.
Individuals, too, could often access both networks, especially when they had relatives
in the PKK and in state employment. One interviewee, a former urban guerilla member,
said that when she was about to receive a heavy jail sentence for aiding the PKK,
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one of her nineteen siblings, who was serving in the Turkish military, saw to it that
her court file disappeared.74 The brother in the army had been highly resentful of the
nationalist activities of some of his family members and accused them of blocking his
promotion in the army. He did, however, move the necessary levers when his sister
was about to receive a jail sentence. Another interviewee recalled the time that her
village guard uncle’s life was spared by a female militant in a PKK ambush in which
all the other village guards were killed, because the uncle had previously helped the
militant’s family. In this case, obligations that had been established previously between
the militant’s family and the village guard in his role as ag˘a carried over to their later
encounter as enemies. Local allegiances, in other words, coexisted with national-level
loyalties and, at times, surpassed them, undermining each side’s project of creating its
ideal national citizen.
The PKK insurgency created a new problem of “legibility” for the Turkish government,
committed, at once, to the assimilation of Kurds into the Turkish nation and to the violent
punishment of those who refused the republic’s offer of Turkish national identity. In such
a setting, the village guard system appeared to resolve an “information problem” for the
government—the question of determining who was truly loyal to the republic. For the
PKK, the village guards appear to have served a similar function, separating collaborators
from patriotic Kurds. Yet a closer inspection reveals that enlisting as a village guard
could also serve the opposite purpose—of becoming illegible. Clan leaders’ access to
local knowledge enabled them to know when and how to enter flexible alliances, while
this information was not available to the state, which “saw” only progovernment and
pro-PKK Kurds. Once they camouflaged as progovernment, village guards could engage
in actions that undermined state authority and the purposes of the war. First, they could
engage in illegal actions—such as smuggling or murder—with little consequence, thus
amassing local power at the expense of the state’s control of everyday life. However
repugnant one may find the purposes of such action, as in the case of the village guards
who caused the massacre in Zanqırt village, one has to note that it created a world
outside the realm of state authority and law. Second, the networks of trust and reciprocity
that were enabled by kinship ties challenged the state’s nation-building project—and
the accompanying war on identity—in more direct ways. For village guards were not
always, or exclusively, “collaborators” who served the state but rather individuals who
juggled multiple identities and who sometimes used the protection enabled by allegiance
to one identity to support their kin on the other side of the dividing line.
C O N C L U S IO N
This article has examined everyday forms of Kurdish resistance grounded in kinship
solidarity in response to a centralizing state. As elsewhere, the attempt to create a new
order based on centralized state power and national citizens in eastern Turkey was a
highly violent process. The lifestyles, moral order, economic networks, and even dress
forms of Kurdish society appeared deviant, if not criminal, from the lens with which
state officials looked to Kurdish society, and all became subjects of regulation.75 I have
suggested in this article that beyond an oppositional Kurdish national identity, kinship
bonds constituted an impressive challenge to the government’s efforts to transform
the Kurdish people into loyal and obedient Turkish citizens. First, local networks of
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trust and reciprocity helped Kurds escape the state’s despotic power and resist the
encroachments of its infrastructural power by enabling Kurds to maintain an important
degree of “illegibility.” Second, by engaging the bureaucracy with an alternative moral
logic based on kin loyalty and reciprocity, Kurds transformed the nature and meaning
of state authority in the lower echelons of the bureaucracy. Third, by facilitating ties
between those on opposing sides of the war for national identity, kinship networks and
solidarity undermined the state’s exclusivist national project.
If the statist literature of the 1980s has overemphasized the developmental and rev-
olutionary capacities of states, the more recent literature on governmentality and the
disciplinary power of state institutions has perhaps overemphasized states’ capacity to
define social order and transform everyday life.76 As numerous scholars inspired by the
work of Foucault have shown with fascinating case studies, the creation of social order
occurs through the everyday practices of bureaucratic agencies—counting and register-
ing people, issuing identity documents, determining the recipients of public resources,
drawing maps, designing public spaces, and more. Such routine practices powerfully
shape the limits of the imaginable and therefore have a “constitutive” effect.77 One must
also note, however, that state practices inevitably encounter resistance as they bump into
alternative imaginations of space and peoplehood. The disproportionate stress scholars
place on Weberian notions of order advanced by states obscures the ways in which
subjects of disciplinary power navigate multiple moral orders and create pockets of
authority and order that often operate according to radically different logics.
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